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IN T H E SUPREME C O U R T
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H
J. E, BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH
E. BAGNALL, and FLOEENCE
BAGNALL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
SUBUEBIA LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho Corporation, et al.,
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Case No.
13753

Brief of Defendants*Appellants
NATTJEE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action to forfeit a real estate
agreement for alleged failure to make the required installments, and to quiet title to some 570 acres of land in
the plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWEE COUET
The Court denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial,
and granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and
against the defendants forfeiting the real estate agreement and quieting title in the plaintiffs, except for an
undivided % interest in 140.15 acres, which the court, by
Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title, awarded
to United Paint and Colors. Plaintiffs' appeal from the
order is also pending before this honorable court.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants (defendants) seek reversal of the Judgment of forfeiture and seek to have judgment entered in
their favor dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff and
reinstating the contract. Defendants further seek to have
the matter remanded back to the District Court for a determination of damages, adjustments and offsets due defendants from the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1, 1952, a real estate agreement was
entered into between Hannah Bagnall and J. R. Bagnall,
as sellers, and Wallace J. Nyberg, Jean B. Nyberg, and
Grlenna A. Nyberg, as buyers. The agreement appears to
have been part of an overall settlement of the estate of
Hannah Bagnall, with th apparent motive being to divide
up the estate at that time, and, as it later turned out, to
avoid a probate. Jean Nyberg, step daughter to Hannah,
and one of the purchasers under the agreement, was the
owner in fee apart from any interest acquired under the
contract, of .57 acres on which one of the two homes on the
property were located, by virtue of a warranty deed dated
January 20, 1939, from Joseph and Hannah Bagnall,
(Abstract P. 112.) She was also the owner of an undivided % interest in 140.15 acres of the land covered
by the real estate agreement. She held that interest as
co-tenant with her brother, J. B. Bagnall, by virtue of a
warranty deed dated January 30, 1939, by which Joseph
F. Bagnall and Hannah Bagnall conveyed to the plaintiff, J. B. Bagnall, and to his sister, Jean B. Nyberg, an
undivided one-half interest in the said 140.15 acres. (B.
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55, 56) The real estate agreement also provided that J ean
had been given a $32,000 interest out of Hannah's share,
leaving a balance of $80,000 equally divided between the
two sellers Hannah and J R. Bagnall.
The real estate agreement was subsequently assigned
to various parties, until it was acquired by Suburbia
Land Company of Idaho in July, 1962. At that time, a
modification agreement was entered into between J I.*
Bagnall and his wife, Fiorenee as 11M- f i l e r s , and > «
burbia Land Company as Mi.* Mi^-r, 1M modification
agreement incorporated the original September 1, 1952,
agreement and made certain modifications therein.
Among other changes, the sellers agreed to place a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title, !•»•
gether wiib nil shares of water stock owned by them, in
escrow at tin- hank of Ephraim. They also agreed ;«»
deliver to the defendants an ur> io date abstract il ;.b soon
as possible", and to clear up any del'eeis that may he
shown in the title within 18 months from the date of the
modification agreement. The defendants herein contend
that the sellers were to render a title opinion " a s soon
afc n o s - a h l e " ' a !su

u n Aiareii o, 1962, 4 and '% months prior ;<* u..
assignment to Suburbia and the execution of the modiiication agreement, JeaiiNyberg, by warranty deed, deeded
the aforementioned 140.15 acres ai-i In- .•! acres to
Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation (E. 72)
Tin* deed purported to convey a fee .simple title t»> a.i
.;;" ii(.- land. Ah-. Xyberg held the Su acres (upon which
the main residence was located) in fee, l»iit had uniy an
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undivided one-half interest in the 140.15 acres. The milking barn, tack room, corrals, and the bulk of all other
improvements, with the exception of the two residences,
were located on the 140.15 acre tract.
On October 5, 1971, Utah Valley Land conveyed
those same interests, by warranty deed, to United Paint
and Colors Company, one of the defendants named in
plaintiffs' amended, amended complaint. An order of
Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was
granted in favor of United Paint & Colors Company on
March 26, 1974, by the above entitled court, thereby
effectively depriving the defendants of a % interest in
the central part of the ranch containing 70% of the
improvements. The matter of the .57 acres has not yet
been litigated.
One of the major concerns of Suburbia as buyer was
the ability of the sellers to deliver an unclouded title.
The sellers agreed to take upon themselves the burden of
preparing an abstract and clearing any defects in the
title. It was the contention of the buyers that sellers were
to render the title opinion also. That contention was disputed by the plaintiffs at the trial. In any event, the
Modification Agreement (which consisted of the Agreement dated July 16, 1962, in conjunction with a letter
from seller to buyer dated July 18, 1962), (Exhibits P.
5 and P. 6), provided that the sellers were to complete
their obligations within 18 months. The abstract was not
completed until sometime in 1965, according to testimony
elicited from the plaintiffs and their former attorney,
and was never delivered to the defendants.

4
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Plaintiffs took no action to clear any defects, maintaining that they had an unclouded title, even to the
140.15 and the .57 acres, and that it was fully marketable
and complied with their obligations under the Real Estate
Agreement and the Modification Agreement. Throughout
much of 1962 and through 1965, at least, Mr. Maxfield
made constant and repeated efforts to obtain the abstract from the plaintiffs or their attorney, Don V.
Tibbs. Beginning in 1963, and continuing throughout
1965, Mr. Maxfield advised the plaintiffs of numerous
title deficiencies. H e advised them of claims made by
third parties to the 140.15 acres which J e a n Nyberg had
deeded away. (Defendants were not then aware of the
problem with the .57 acres). He advised them of claims
made by a Mr. Don Powell to a 63 acre tract and to a
76.94 acres tract, and so forth. It was undisputed that
Maxfield obtained deeds from Mr. Powell, that he deeded
the property therein to the Bagnalls, and that they, in
turn deeded it back to Suburbia of Nevada (one of the
successor corporations). There was dispute at the trial
as to the reasons therefore, and the effect thereof. Defendants maintained that it was to clear up some of the
title defects and that plaintiffs agreed to a moratorium
on payments until December, 1971. Plaintiffs disagreed
with that contention, denying that there had been any
moratorium.
During much of this time, and especially beginning
in 1964, the defendants were not making all of their payments. I t was their contention that many of those payments were missed with the approval of the plaintiffs because of their failure to obtain the abstract and to clear
5
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up the title defects. Also, the plaintiffs were in default.
As stated, they did not obtain the abstract until 1965. They
did not deliver it to the defendants. They did not render a
title opinion. They did not have all of the water stock in
the escrow as agreed until 1973! Joseph Albert Bagnall,
son of the plaintiff, is the owner of record of approximately 5.56 acres of the ground. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railway is the owner in fee simple of a strip 1
chain by 40 chains along the eastern boundary and has an
easement containing along the balance of the eastern
boundary of the ranch, all taking about 3 acres. There
is a county road running through the middle of the ranch
not mentioned in the contract or the warranty deed consuming 2 acres. Defendants allege a private easement
consuming about one acre also runs through the ranch and
is not mentioned in any of the conveyances or agreements.
On April 25,1962, suit was commenced to forfeit the
agreement and a lis pendens was recorded. That lis pendens has not been removed of record and constitutes a
cloud on the title. On February 18,1970, plaintiff entered
into an oil and gas lease to Phillips Petroleum which included all of the property contemplated in the Real Estate
Agreement (which even included the property belonging to J. A. Bagnall and 17.54 acres of land which the
buyers had purchased outright at the time of the signing
of the modification agreement in 1962), wherein they
purported to lease all of the oil and gas rights to the
property, as well as all of the water rights with the exception of well waters. This, of course, constituted a
deliberate cloud upon the title, even though Phillips probably could not prevail in a suit with the buyers.
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During the latter part of June, 1969, it became apparent to Reed R. Maxfield, then president of Suburbia
Land Company, of Utah, that the plaintiff could not
comply with their agreement and were about to attempt
forfeiture of the contract. On July 5, 1969, Mr. Maxfield,
acting on behalf of Suburbia, made a written tender to
plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, of "any and all amounts that are
due . . . under the terms of . . . (the) real estate contract." As part of that tender, Suburbia asked the plaintiffs to tell them how much was due. There were no restrictions or conditions attached to the tender. Plaintiffs
rejected the tender and asked, instead, not for the delinquencies due under the contract, but demanded, the
full accelerated balance due in two separate letters. There
was no provision in the contract for an acceleration. Defendants again tendered, in writing, payment of the
delinquencies, without acceleration, and asked the plaintiffs to set forth the amount. That tender was never accepted by the plaintiffs either.
Within a few days of the July 5 tender, Mr. and Mrs.
Bagnall went to the Maxfield's house on the ranch at
Chester. They testified that they came to accept the
tender (a position wholly contrary to their stipulation
that they never accepted the tender), while the defendants testified that they were told by the Bagnalls at that
time that they did not want the money, they were de^termined to take the ranch back.
On July 31,1970, a notice of default was served upon
Reed R. Maxfield, demanding the whole of the accelerated balance due under the agreement, together with
interest and penalties in an unspecified amount, and

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

taxes. Lester Romero, then president of Suburbia of Utah,
the only surviving corporation, was advised of the notice
and contacted plaintiffs attorney, Merlin 0 . Baker, and
once again tendered payment in writing of all amounts
actually due on the contract and asked the plaintiffs to
specify the amount due. The trial court ruled this tender
to be timely and within the time allotted by the plaintiffs
in their notice of forfeiture. The notice of forfeiture was
obviously in error, having asked for the accelerated balance ($48,535.70 plus taxes and interest) contrary to the
provisions of the contract. There were various letters
back and forth thereafter, Suburbia each time tendering
payment of the delinquencies. Plaintiffs refused to
acknowledge that Suburbia of Utah, or Lester Romero,
had anything to do with the agreement and proceeded
with suit against the Idaho corporation filed about November 4, 1970. It was not until October, 1971, that the
Nevada and Utah corporations, together with Lester R.
Romero were joined as defendants.
Then on August 19, 1971, the plaintiffs completely
reversed themselves, repudiated the contract, (and, defendants believe, waived their notice of default) by mailing a Notice to Quit to the defendants Maxfield, advising them that the Modification Agreement was void and
that they were considered tenants at will and giving them
five days to quit the premises.
On December 1, 1971, defendants delivered to the
escrow, the Bank of Ephraim, a regular monthly payment for $400.00, which sum the bank accepted, receipted,
and posted to interest on December 1, 1971. I t should be
noted that the plaintiffs had never notified the escrow
8
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of their notice of forfeiture. It is the defendants' position that the acceptance of this payment, after notice of
default effectively waived the default and the contract
must be re-instated, if, indeed, it was ever in doubt.
After many motions and countermotions. After long
and involved pre-trial hearings, and after much pain and
suffering on both sides, the trial herein commenced in
the Sanpete County Courthouse on April 22, 1974, before the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge pro-tem. It
is from the results of that trial that defendants take this
appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER
THE TERMS OF THE MODIFICATION
AGREEMENT AND MUST CORRECT
THEIR OWN DEFAULTS BEFORE THEY
CAN DEFAULT THE DEFENDANTS
FAILURE TO ACQUIRE AND MAINTAIN
MARKETABLE TITLE. The testimony and evidence
produced by the defendants at the trial that plaintiffs
did not have title to all of the land, and could not convey according to the tenor of the Modification Agreement, and the Warranty Deed, stands uncontroverted.
The testimony of Jackson Wanless (T-354) shows that
the railroad right of way encroaches 33 feet along the
entire east side of the ranch taking three acres (T-353);
that a minimum of two acres is taken up by county
roads (T-356), and one acre is consumed by a private
easement. Whether the private easement exists was subject to some dispute. The other matters are uncontroverted. A reading of the Real Estate Agreement (Ex9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hibit P-4), the Modification Agreement and the letter
of July 18 (Exhibits P-5 & 6), and the Warranty Deed
placed into the escrow (Exhibit P-7) reveal that nothing was said about the railroad, the county roads, or the
private easement.
The Modification Agreement provided as follows:
"The Sellers agree to place a Warranty Deed
conveying good and marketable title to the premises as described in said Agreement, together with
all shares of water stock owned by them in Escrow
at the Bank of Ephraim, Utah.' V
They placed the warrnaty deed in the escrow, but
there was no mention in either the deed or the modification agreement of the railroad, the county road, or the
private easement. In addition, and even more importantly, there was no mention of an undivided % interest
in 140.15 acres of the land contemplated by the agreement which plaintiffs could not convey. As heretofore
stated in the statement of facts, Jean B. Nyberg, one
of the purchasers under the terms of the September 1,
1952, agreement, had, apart from any interest under the
agreement, an undivided % interest in 140.15 acres contained in the agreement. This 140.15 acres contains virtually all of the improvements on the ranch, with the
exception of the two homes. (See testimony of Eeed
Maxfield, T-325, & Exhibit D-38). On March 3, 1962,
prior to the assignment of the contract to defendants,
Mrs. Nyberg, by warranty deed, conveyed the same
140.15 acres to Utah Valley Land and Development
Corporation. Utah Valley subsequently conveyed by warranty deed to United Paint and Colors, a Utah corporation. The trial court ruled that this constituted a defect upon the title, that plaintiffs had not cleared the
10
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defect prior to the notice of default, and that the defendants were entitled to damages therefore. (Pre-trial
order, pages 6 and 7, paragraph 12, R-....). Furthermore, the trial court granted a summary judgment quieting title to an undivided % interest thereto in United
Paint and Colors, effectively depriving both the vendors
and the purchasers of any interest therein.
In February, 1970, prior to service of the notice of
default, plaintiffs leased the oil and gas and water
rights to the property. The trial court ruled this a defect for which defendants were entitled to damages.
J. B. Bagnall testified that he had a son named
Joseph A. Bagnall (T-7), and that he (J. R. Bagnall)
had never used that name. He was then shown Exhibit
D-22, a warranty deed wherein plaintiffs, J. R. Bagnall
and Florence Bagnall deeded the ranch property to
themselves as tenants in common. The deed, however,
recites that Joseph R. Bagnall is also known as J. A.
Bagnall, and the said J. A. Bagnall purports to be a
grantor. On page 9 of the transcript, Mr. Bagnall admits that " possibly Joseph should have signed this toa.
I don't know. I have never used the name Joseph A.
Bagnall. That is sacred to my son." On page 14, reading from the deposition of J. R. Bagnall, the following
colloquy took place concerning the interest of Joseph
Albert Bagnall in the property, and the reason for the
deed:
" A Answer: 'He had interest in approximately
two acres or two point something acres, and in
order to make this so that we could make a clear
transaction — if this was ever completed, that
he deeded that to myself so that to clear the title
so that we could furnish clear title to —' "
11
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"Q

Then the question:'To whom!'
i

" A To whom?' Answer: 'To whoever paid for
this contract, if and when this was ever paid for.
That was part of clearing up the —' Then I
should have said titles.''
On page 34 of volume 105 of the abstract (Exhibit
P-8), we find a deed from Mary Ellen Allred aka Mary
Ellen Acord to Joseph A. Bagnall, deeding three small
pieces of property located in the Moroni Meadows (a
p a r t of the ranch) containing a total of 2.5 acres. This
is undoubtedly the property referred to by plaintiff as
belonging to his son. The abstract shows that even today,
the said property is still in the name of Joseph A. Bagnall, and hence constitutes a defect in the title.
On page 37 of the abstract, under date of December 31, 1952, Frank D. and F a u n T. Acord deed to
Joseph A. Bagnall three pieces of property located in
the Moroni Meadows. The acreage of the first tract is
unspecified but clearly contains approximately 3.5 acres.
The next two tracts contain 3.44, and 2.06 acres respectively. J . A. Bagnall subsequently conveyed the 3.44
acre tract to the plaintiffs, but the remaining two tracts
containing approximately 5.56 acres remain in the name
of J. A. Bagnall, constituting a defect in plaintiffs' title.
On page 183 the abstract contains a notice of lis
pendens dated April 25, 1962, stating that an action had
been commenced in the Sanpete County Court by J. E.
Bagnall and Florence Bagnall, against Wallace J. Nyberg, J e a n B. Nyberg, Darwin Nyberg, Grlenna A. Nyberg, Donald W. Denton, Edwin N. Mortinson, Mr. and
Mrs. Guy Eedmond, Virgil Eedmond, and Waldo Harris
as defendants for the purpose of terminating the 1952
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real estate agreement and recovering possession of the
lands covered thereby. That lis pendens has never been
released.
Parcel number 11 as described in the real estate
agreement (Exhibit P-4) is owned of record by Caroline
M. Hansen, Eva Josephen Hansen, and Mark Sharp
Hansen. There is no conveyance of record by which the
plaintiffs obtained title to that 1.5 acres.
Thirty-three feet of the entire eastern boundary of
the property is subject to the rights granted under a
•"Eight of Way Warranty D e e d " from Lars R. Christensen et, ux., to SanPete Valley Railway Company dated
July 11, 1896. This same "easement'' was discussed
above, but it appears that rather than merely an easement, a fee simple interest was conveyed by the deed,
together with the right of the railway to encroach upon
the adjoining lands for the purpose of building and constructing a roadbed and railway. The assets of SanPete
Valley Railway Company were subsequently acquired
by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad.
All of these defects in the title are substantial and
material. There appears to be no way in which plaintiffs can acquire clear title thereto. Even if they can,
it is their obligation to do so, and until they have done
so, defendants are not obligated, under pain of default,
to continue making their payments, at least not until
a determination has been made of the damages suffered
by the defendants.
In the case of MacLeodd vs. Hamilton, 236 N.W.
912 (Mich. 1931), the plaintiff vendor attempted to foreclose a land contract for default in the payment of installment payments and taxes. The buyer defended on
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the ground (among others) that the seller did not have
clear title by virtue of an easement for a drain granted
to the county in 1876. The court dismissed the complaint and held that, even though the easement had,
in all probability, been abandoned by the county and
constituted an easily removable cloud on the title, the
seller must clear the defect from the record before he
could default the vendee, and before he could bring suit
or foreclosure. The Court said:
"The mere record of the outstanding easement is sufficient to command assurances to defendant against the contingencies of a lawsuit.
Piatt vs. Newman, 71 Mich. 112, 38 N.W. 720. The
easement is undoubtedly moribund, and under
the evidence constitutes no justification for rescission by defendant, but does require plaintiff,
before exacting performance by defendant, to be
in a position to tender a marketable title. The
plaintiff can remove the cloud, now of record,
and file a new bill to foreclose/'
In other words, even though the cloud was, at most,
merely technical and easily removable, the vendor must
remove it before he can default the buyer and foreclose.
The sellers (Bagnalls) claimed they were aware of
all of these defects (according to their own testimony),
including the interest of Jean Nyberg, at the time of
the making of the modification agreement. Yet they
made no mention thereof in any of the descriptions —
neither in the agreements nor in the warranty deed. The
implied covenants in the September 1, 1952, agreement,
and the modification agreement, that they could convey a fee simple title to all of the land, and especially
the warranties contained in the warranty deed that they
conveyed and warranted a fee simple without reservation, is binding upon the plaintiffs.
14
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57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth the
covenants that are a part of the warranty deed:
"Such deed when executed . . . (Constitutes
conveyance) with covenants from the grantor . . .
that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that
he has good right to convey the same; that he
guarantees . . . the quiet possession thereof; that
the premises are free from all encumbrances . . . "
57-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
" A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate,
unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended." (Emphasis added)
In Van Cott vs. Jacklin, 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924),
the vendee sued the vendor for breach of the warranties
and the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Vendor, by warranty deed, had conveyed land, some of which he apparently did not own, although the proper boundaries
were clearly marked on the property, and vendee apparently had knowledge of the actual boundaries at the
time he accepted the deed. The vendee conceded that
he had been excluded from only a small area. The court
held that, nevertheless, the warranties in the deed would
control, and plaintiff was awarded damages for the property from which he was excluded. The importance of
Van Cott, so far as Bagnall vs. Suburbia is concerned,
is that the warranties cover known defects as well as
unknown. Bagnall must clear the easements and other
title defects even if defendants knew about them before
he can default the defendants. Compare also Leavitt vs.
Blohm, 357 P.2d 190 (Utah 1960); Creason vs. Peterson,
24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 402 (Utah 1970); Schiff vs.
Dixon (Okla. 1951), 227 P.2d 639; Piatt vs. Newman
(Mich. 1888), 38 N.W. 720.
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in construing the
effect of a statute outlining the warranties and effect of
a warranty deed similar to the one in effect in Utah stated:

••

" I f a deed contains an assurance to the purchaser that the grantors have the very estate in
quality which they purport to convey, and in
fact the grantors have a lesser estate, such covenant is considered broken as of the time of execution and delivery of the conveyance." Emphasis
added.

The defendants had sought to rely upon a statement
in 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, Sec. 69, asserting that the
covenants were prospective in nature and could only be
broken by an eviction. The court rejected that argument upon the ground that the statute (57-1-3 and 57-1-13
in Utah) superseded the common law and was controlling.
Whereupon the court said:
"Covenants of 'seisn' and 'good right to convey' are synonymous, and, if broken at all, are
broken when made, and an actual eviction is unnecessary to consumate the breach." Emphasis
added.
" I n an action for breach of the covenants of
seisin and good right to convey, an eviction need
not be alleged; but it is sufficient in charging a
breach to negative the words of the covenants gender ally." Emphasis added.
And finally, in the case of Greason vs. Peterson, 24
Utah 2d 305 (1970), 470 P.2d 403, the Utah court held
that " T h e r e is a breach of warranty when it is shown
that the grantor did not own the land that he purported
to convey by warranty deed description; it is not necessary to show an actual eviction or threat thereof." What
more can be added!!
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FAILURE TO TENDER ABSTRACT AS REQUIRED BY THE LETTER OF JULY 18, 1962. On
page 5 of the pre-trial order, the trial court found, as
a matter of law, that the July 18, 1962, letter from J. R.
Bagnall to Suburbia Land Company constituted a part
of the modification agreement. It was also stipulated
in the pre-trial order that the abstract was never delivered to the defendants prior to the institution of the
lawsuit herein. The letter provided as follows (Exhibit
P-6):
"So also, the undersigned agree to clear up
any defects that may be shown in the title concerning the property as set forth in the Modification Agreement within 18 months from date, it
being understood that the abstract shall be examined and a Title Opinion rendered as soon as
possible."
The testimony of both Mr. Bagnall and Don V.
Tibbs was to the effect that it was the sellers obligation
to render the abstract, that it was not even completed
until sometime in 1965, and was never delivered.
FAILURE TO DEPOSIT NEGOTIABLE WATER
STOCK INTO ESCROW. The record and testimony of
plaintiffs' witnesses clearly demonstrate that all of the
water stock was not in the escrow in the proper names
until April 4,1973. Even today, it has not all been properly endorsed! Of the total number of shares deposited
in the escrow, 6 shares were deposited March 15, 1971,
and ten shares were delayed until April 3, 1973.
EFFECT OF DEFAULT ON THE PART OF THE
PLAINTIFFS. In the case of Leavitt vs. Blohm (1960),
11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d 190, referred to above, the
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court had occasion to determine the effect of the vendor's failure to perfect his title before attempting to
default the purchaser. The court stated on page 193:
" It is to be kept in mind that the obligations
of such contract run both ways. It is true that
if the buyer fails to make his payments he cannot
enforce his rights. By the same token, if the
seller fails to meet his commitment he likewise
cannot expect the buyer to perform. An important attribute of the ownership of real property
and one of the things for which Mrs. Blohm was
paying, was the right to the quiet and peaceable
enjoyment of it. She had the right to look to the
Leavitts not to leave her vulnerable to being disturbed therein. Her responsibility to make payments to them was dependent upon their fulfillment of this duty to her." Emphasis added.
Leavitt was the assignee of the seller's interest, and
Blohm the assignee of the buyers interest in a contract
to purchase the El Rancho Motel in Heber, Utah. The
series of conveyances are rather confusing, but the substance of the facts as they applied at the trial was that
the assignee of the sellers interest, Leavitt, was apparently unable to extricate himself from difficulty and
was about to be forfeited out of his interest by the original owner, thereby terminating any equitable interest
Blohm had in the property. The court held that this potential was not an excuse for failure to pay on the part
of the defendants, but that before Leavitt could default
Blohm, Leavitt must clear title and tender a good deed
to Blohm. In other words, the failure on the part of one
party did not excuse the failure on the part of the other,
but that before either could enforce the contract, that
party had to tender full and complete performance.
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In Sorensen vs. Larue, (Idaho 1927), 252 P. 494, the
court stated that the vendor must furnish good title as
of the date required by the contract, and failing to do
so, even though the buyer was admittedly unable to
make the payments, vendor could not default the vendee
and bring suit for foreclosure. In other words, he must
tender performance as required by the contract before
he can default the vendee, even though the vendee be
actually in default himself, and unable to make the payments. See also Moter vs. Hershey, (S.D. 1925), 205
N.W. 239; Kessler vs. Pruitt (Idaho 1908), 93 P. 965;
Roberts vs. Braffett (Utah 1907), 22 Utah 51, 92 P. 789;
Ontjes vs. Thomas, 187 N.W. 726 (S.D. 1922); MajorBlakeney Corp. vs. Jenkins (Calif. 1953), 263 P.2d 655;
Coy Brown vs. Harold H. and Clarice D. Griffin (Mont.
1968), 436 P.2d 695; Carroll vs. Scott (Iowa 1919), 170
N.W. 790, all standing for the proposition that the vendor must tender merchantable title, as shown by the abstract, before he can default the vendee.
Although it is the general rule in most circumstances,
that the vendor is obligated to make title only at the
time fixed for the payment of the last installment, or
at the time fixed by the contract, he is, nevertheless, by
the authority of the preceding cases, required to make
title, and cure all of his own defects, before he can default the purchasers. This is especially required of
Bagnall where he has, in effect, demanded the last payment when he demanded the entire balance due under
the contract. In addition, the courts uniformly hold that
the covenants in the warranty deed are breached at the
time the deed is executed and delivered. In the instant
case, then, the time for Bagnall to make title would have
been at the time the warranty deed was executed and
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delivered to the escrow. The modification agreement
supports this timing. The agreement could not possibly
contemplate placing the deed in escrow at the time of
the making of the last payment, else why the escrow.
In addition, the letter of July 18 requires Bagnall to
supply an up to date abstract, and (buyers contend) title
opinion, neither of which was complied with before commencing suit herein, nor had they properly endorsed and
deposited all of the water stock, and etc.
In the Idaho case of Sorensen vs. Larue, discussed
briefly above, the contract called for the purchaser to
make certain installment payments amounting to some
$36,370 plus interest. The last installment of $8,000 was
due March 5, 1922. The vendor was to furnish an abstract of title fifteen days before the last installment
was paid showing title free and clear except for certain
designated encumbrances. The vendor did not tender
the abstract until after March 5, and the purchaser did
not tender the final payment at all. In fact, on February
27, he advised the vendors that he could not make the
payment and proposed alternate arrangements.
The vendor, after the time fixed by the agreement,
tendered the abstract which the purchasers then objected
to on the ground that there were defects in the title. The
seller took no steps to clear the title and at all times insisted that the title offered was sufficient and in compliance with the contract. The buyers made no tender
of the final payment at any time. Action was brought
to forfeit, and the purchaser defended on the ground
that the sellers had not tendered an abstract showing
good and sufficient title as required by the contract.
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After trial it was determined that there were, indeed, defects in title as shown by the abstracts, and the
vendors were allowed a number of months to clear them
up. The trial court thereafter determined that the title
was good, and allowed the purchasers 7 months in which
to raise the final payment. When payment was not made
within the 7 months, the court entered a decree of forfeiture from which the defendant appealed. The entire
decision is recommended to the Court for careful study.
The decision, as it applies to Bagnall vs. Suburbia, can
be summed up by two headnotes on page 494 as follows:
"Purchaser need not tender payment if vendor is unable to furnish abstract required by contract" and
"Counsel's admissions of purchaser's inability to make
payments after purchaser had right to refuse to make
payments are immaterial.'' The court further held that
the vendor must furnish good title as of the date required by the contract, that the tender of such an abstract was a condition precedent to defaulting the purchaser, and that until the vendor had complied with his
obligations under the contract, the purchaser was under
no duty to tender payments, as such tender would be
useless until the plaintiff had corrected his defaults.
In the case of Roberts vs. Braffett (Utah 1907), 22
Utah 51, 92 P. 789, the court held that:
"Where time is of the essence of a contract
of sale of real estate, but neither party exercised
his right to declare an end to the contract, the
vendor cannot, when the stipulations of the contract are mutual, dependent, and concurrent, legally place the other party in default until he
himself had tendered performance by tender of
a deed, and accounting for the purchase money.'f
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In Tremonton Inv. Co. vs. Horn (Utah 1921), 202
P. 547, the plaintiff contracted for the sale of certain
real property to the defendant. As it later turned out,
the vendor was himself the purchaser of the land under a prior real estate contract which ultimately went
into default. When defendants realized the financial predicament of the seller-plaintiff, they refused to make
any further payments and the vendor brought action to
forfeit their contract. The court held that the purchaser
should be relieved of his default.
In Stewart Livestock Co. vs. Ostler (Utah 1942),
144 P.2d 276, the plaintiff-seller had agreed to convey
title by warranty deed and to deliver an abstract showing "perfect title". The court held that "perfect title"
meant marketable title as shown by the abstract. As it
turned out, the plaintiff didn't have title to over 600
acres of the property but alleged that the defendant's
title was nevertheless good by reason of adverse possession, and that they had never been ejected. The court
held that did not meet the seller's obligations to furnish
good and sufficient tile, stating that "the mere fact that
the grantee might actually prevail in litigation against
the record owner or against any other person, would not
satisfy the requirement that the grantor convey a marketable title".
There remains, of course, the very real problem of
the .57 acres. United Paint and Colors is the record
owner and will undoubtedly bring a quiet title action
against the plaintiffs in the near future. It seems a
foregone conclusion that they will prevail. Plaintiffs,
therefore, cannot deliver the dwellings at all, and can
only deliver a y% interest to the 140.15 acres. These two
parcels contain all improvements of any significance on
the property.
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POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS MADE VALID AND
TIMELY TENDEE TO THE PLAINTIFFS
OF ALL DELINQUENCIES DUE UNDEE
THE CONTEACT
Under date of July 5, 1969, Eeed E. Maxfield, on
behalf of Suburbia Land Company, made a tender "of
any and all amounts that are due J. E. Bagnall under
the terms of that certain real estate contract dated September 1, 1962". (Exhibit P-15) Plaintiffs then attorney, Don V. Tibbs, responded by letter of July 9,
1969, (Exhibit P-16) demanding "full satisfaction of the
indebtedness", and declaring that "your proposed partial payments will not be accepted". Again, on July 14,
1969, plaintiffs California counsel, Cree-L. Kofford, advised the defendants that the full accelerated balance of
the contract amounting to $48,535.70, together with taxes
amounting to $582.93, and certain unspecified sums of
interest be paid within ten days. After receipt of Mr.
Tibbs letter of July 9, and prior to receipt of Mr. Kofford 's letter of July 14, Mr. Maxfield again made tender
to Mr. Tibbs of all amounts now due and all installments
which hereafter become due. (Exhibit P-18)
The trial court ruled that the July 5 letter from
Maxfield on behalf of Suburbia constituted tender legally sufficient to prevent defendant's default and that
the Tibbs ' letter of July 9, 1969, and the Kofford letter
of July 14, 1969, constituted rejection of the tender, and
excused the defendants from further payments on the
contract until acceptance thereof unless plamtiffs should
be able to establish that the defendants were unable to
perform at the time of the tender, or a reasonable time
thereafter had the tender in fact been accepted. (Pretrial order, page 4, paragraph 2, see E ....)
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Just over one year after Maxfield's tender, the
plaintiffs, on July 31, 1970, served notice upon Suburbia
Land Company improperly demanding the entire accelerated balance of $48,535.20, together with taxes and unspecified sum for interest. (Exhibit P-31) The reader
will recall that the contract does not provide for acceleration of the balance upon default. On August 28, 1970,
Mr. Lester Romero, president of Suburbia Land Company, again tendered, in writing, "all amounts actually
due". (Exhibit P-32) The trial court ruled that this
letter from Mr. Romero constituted tender within the
30 days provided in the plaintiff's notice of forfeiture
and was legally sufficient to prevent the defendants'
default unless the plaintiffs could establish that the defendants were unable to perform at the time of the tender or a reasonable time thereafter, had the tender
in fact been accepted. (Pre-trial order, page 5, paragraph
3,R~~)
As can readily be seen, defendants tendered, in writing payment of all delinquencies on July 5, 1969, and
again on July 14, 1969. These tenders were rejected and
an improper notice of default served upon Suburbia
July 31, 1970. Thereafter, and within the 30 days provided in the notice, the defendants again tendered payment of all delinquencies. The only question left open
for trial was the question of whether the tenders were
made in "good faith". The burden of proof was upon
the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants could not
perform at the time of the tender or within a reasonable
time thereafter.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED THE
TENDERS WERE MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND
VALID AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as
follows:
" 78-27-1. Tender — Offer in writing sufficient.
— An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of
money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property, is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the
money, instrument or property.''
The Utah statute also provides the way in which the
tenderee may protect himself from the effects of a written tender in the event the offer is not made in good
faith, the offeror cannot produce the money, or the offeree has some other valid objection to the tender.
"78-27-3. Objection to tender — Must be specified or deemed waived. — The person to whom a
tender is made must, at the time, specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument or
property, or he is deemed to have waived it; and,
if the objection is to the amount of money, the
terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of
property, he must specify the amounts, terms or
kinds which he requires, or he precluded from
objection afterwards.'' Italics added.
In other words, defendants' offer, in writing to pay
"any and all amounts that are due to J. B. Bagnall",
is equivalent to the tender of the actual money. There
is no other way in which the statute can be read. Even
if we concede, for the sake of argument, that the defendants could not produce the money if the tender had
been accepted, there is no mischief done by accepting
the statute on its face, i.e., that the defendants' written
tender is equivalent to the actual production of the
money, and that it is equivalent irrespective of their
ability to produce it.
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Under the Common Law, it was necessary to actually have the money in sight at the time the tender
was made. Such a requirement, in the light of modern
day business methods, is not only cumbersome and impractical, but completely contrary to the normal expectations and practice of the business community. The
statute was designed to remedy this anomaly. Under the
statute, a businessman, consistent with his normal expectations, can make an offer in writing. Such an offer
fixes the legal rights of the parties until such time as
it is accepted or rejected. In the event that it is accepted, normal business practice would dictate that the
offeror be given enough time to produce the funds in
the normal course of business. Or, if the offeree so
chooses, he probably can insist upon virtual instant production upon acceptance. In the Bagnall case, however,
not only was the offer not accepted, it was rejected and
an improper demand made for the entire contract balance together with interest, taxes, and etc.
If plaintiffs had, in good faith, actually intended
to extend to the defendants the opportunity to pay the
valid delinquencies, or even the opportunity to pay the
improper and excessive amounts demanded in their
notice, it would have been simple enough for them to
have accepted the defendants' tender. Upon acceptance,
the financial condition and ability of the defendants to
produce would have been almost instantaneously apparent. If they could produce, they would do so. If they
could not, it would become immediately apparent.
On the other hand, had the plaintiffs found any reason to object to the tender, or if they believed the defendants unable to produce, they could have made objection as provided in 78-27-3. The cases of Hymas vs.
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Bamberger (1894), 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202, and Sieverts vs.
White (1954), 2 Utah 2d. 351, 273 P.2d 974, support this
contention. The Hymas court said that "To have the
effect of a valid tender, the party tendering must have
the ability to produce it, and must act in good faith".
Without more, this statement would seem to belie the
defendants? position herein, but it is actually supportive
of the defendants when the entire decision is considered.
Obviously a tender in writing cannot forever forestall
the offeree from asserting his legal rights if the party
making tender cannot produce. Everyone would agree
to that. It is the application of the statute that is important however. The Hymas court goes on to state that
if the offeree " accepts, and the debtor fails to produce
the money, his tender will be of no avail". Certainly
that is so, and the Hymas case charts the course which
the two parties must follow.
In Hymas, the tender was made and accepted.
Thereafter, the offerer was unable, even after an extended period of time, to produce the money. The court,
quite naturally held that under such circumstances the
tender failed. That is a long way from saying there
was any obligation on the offeror to prove his ability
to perform, if the tender was not accepted. What the
court said was that if the offer was accepted and THEN
he was unable to perform, the offer was void.
The Sieverts case appears at first blush to be contrary to the defendant's position until a more critical
look is taken. Sieverts revolved around a tender made
by check, and anything said therein is not necessarily
pertinent to the offer made by the defendants to the
Bagnalls in this case. It is clear that a check, unless accepted as payment in and of itself, is not the payment
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of money, but is merely an order upon the bank instructing it to pay the money upon presentation. It is, in
other words a promise to pay money in the future. This
is completely different from the tender made to the
Bagnalls, which was a tender under the statute to pay
any and all amounts due. The statute says that such a
tender is equivalent to the actual production and tender
of the money. The statute does not say that the tender
of a check is equivalent. 78-27-1 refers specifically to
a particular manner of tender, and does not include the
tender of a check or negotiable instrument, does not contemplate nor cover the physical tender of goods, and etc.
It goes solely to the question of a tender in writing to
deliver the money, check, negotiable instrument, physical goods, and etc. Section 3 of statute (78-27-3), however, has a broader and more general application. It
refers, not only to the tender contemplated in Section 1,
but to any and all tenders, and it specifically states that
the objection must be made at the time of the offer or
it is deemed waived.
The reader is referred to the concurring opinion of
Justice Crockett in the Sieverts case. He takes the position that even where a tender is made by check, there is
no necessity that there be funds on deposit at the time
the check is drawn and delivered. Quoting from page 977
of the Pacific Reporter, Justice Crockett said:
' "If such a check were refused there would be
no practical use of arranging for the money or
credit to cover it. This might entail considerable
inconvenience, difficulty or even hardship, to no
useful purpose. Serious injustices might result
if the offeree in such a transaction could defeat
proof of tender simply by showing that the offeror had not sufficient funds in the bank to
cover the check at the time it was offered.''
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"* * * If the offeree has failed to state an objection, or objects on other grounds, it would be
manifestly unfair to permit him to defeat proof
of tender by check on the sole ground that there
were not sufficient funds to cover the check at
the time tender was made, because the offeror
may have arranged for payment of the check, if
it had been accepted. This reasoning is reflected
in our statute which requires the person to whom
a tender is made to 'specify any objection' he has
thereto or be ideemed to have waived it.' "
Justice Crockett's concurring opinion is actually the
opinion of the majority of the court. Justices Crockett,
McDonough and Wade were in agreement as to the
meaning of the statutes and the effect of the tender by
check made in that case. Justice Worthen did not participate and Justice Henriod had disqualified himself.
It appears that Judge Dunford, who wrote the opinion,
was filling in for Henriod, and that the single remaining judge must have concurred with Dunford. It is the
defendants' contention that the two cases of Hymas vs.
Bamberger and Sieverts vs. White definitely support
the proposition that there is, and should be, no requirement that the defendants make any showing whatsoever
that they had the ability to perform their tenders, especially at this late date, and after express rejection
thereof by the plaintiffs. The fact that the written tender was made should be, in and of itself, sufficient to
prevent the plaintiffs from putting the defendants into
default and should, therefore, defeat their claims for
relief.
In the case of Bemice Ulibarri vs. Joseph Christenson, et al, (1954) 2 U.2d 367, 275 P.2d. 170, defendant
accepted a check for $300 in exchange for a release for
the wrongful death of plaintiff's 17 year old son. In at29
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tempting to avoid the release, plaintiff claimed that the
check was not legal tender and therefore no consideration had been given for the release. The Utah court
made short shrift of that contention. Justice Crockett,
writing for the court quoted 78-27-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows:
" The person to whom a tender is made must,
at the time, specify any objection he may have
* * * or he is deemed to have waived it * * *."
Justice Crockett goes on to say:
" I t is well settled that a tender by check in
lieu of cash is sufficient unless it is objected to
on that ground. No objection was made to the
check at the time it was delivered. Had it been,
the defendants would have had an opportunity
to substitute cash to obviate the objection. In
the absence of such objection plaintiff cannot
now complain of failure of consideration because
it was a check instead of cash, unless the check
had been presented for payment and dishonored. This was not done. From aught that appears, if she had presented the check for payment it would have been paid, and defendants
now stand ready and willing to see that the
check is paid so that their part of the bargain
will be-kept."
So also in the instant case. It is well settled that
a written offer to pay money is, if not accepted, the
equivalent of the actual production and tender of the
money. No objection was made to the defendants' tender at the time it was delivered. Had it been, the defendants would have had an opportunity to substitute
cash to obviate the objection. In the absence of such
objection, the Bagnalls cannot now complain that the
tender was not made in good faith unless they actually
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accepted the offer and the defendants did not perform
on their tender. This was not done. From aught that
appears, if Bagnalls had accepted the tender of payment, it would have been paid, and defendants now stand
ready and willing to see that the tender is paid so that
their part of the bargain will be kept.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT INABILITY OF THE
DEFENDANTS TO PEEFOEM WOULD DEFEAT
THEIE TENDEES, THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE CLEAELY DEMONSTEATES THAT THEY
WEEE FULLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING HAD
THEIE TENDEES BEEN ACCEPTED.
Special interrogatory number 12 of the Special Verdict of the Jury (R-684), asks the following:
"Do you find by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant Suburbia Land Company of
Utah, or Eeed E. Maxfield, or Lester E. Romero,
was not ready, able and willing to pay the delinquencies on the contracts, marked Exhibits 3 and
5, on July 5, 1969, or August 28, 1970?"
As will be discussed later, the jury in this matter
was a typical "home town" jury and demonstrated its
prejudice in favor of their home town people, J. E. and
Florence Bagnall. Even so, the jury was compelled
by the evidence adduced at the trial to answer the foregoing interrogatory in favor of defendants. They had
to find that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden
of showing that the defendants could not perform their
tender.
All documentary and testimentary evidence adduced
at the trial shows beyond doubt that the defendants
could have performed if their tenders had been accepted
by the plaintiffs. Judge Don V. Tibbs was called as a
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witness for the plaintiffs. He had acted as their lawyer
at the time the Modification Agreement was signed in
1962. On cross examination he was asked about the
money displayed by Mr. Maxfield during the negotiations, and responded as follows: (T-99)
" A My recollection is that Mr. Maxfield came
in some bib overalls, farm overalls, and they were
big and, of course, I didn't know him and he sat
down and I told him that he was going to have
to have some money and he started to bring out,
as I recall, tens and twenty dollar bills in sacks."
'' Q Bringing them out of where ?"
. " A Oh, every place that you could imagine, out
of those overalls and I didn't think that there
was that much money that came in overalls, if I
may put it that way."
Mr. Bagnall, on cross examination (T 21, 22), testified that during the negotiations preceding the signing of the 1962 modification agreement, Mr. Maxfield
came to the meeting in Mr. Tibbs office with a suitcase
full of money. He states that the suitcase was longer,
wider, and thicker than an attache case and appeared
to be full of bills: "More bills than I had ever seen in
my life, either before or since, in bundles about so large."
Mrs. Bagnall also verified that there had been such a
suitcase full of money. (T-158)
What monies were available in 1962, of course, have
no bearing upon what monies were available in 1969
and 1970. It is evident, however, that Maxfield was in
the habit of keeping large sums of money in cash, and
of dealing directly in cash rather than with checks or
some of the more conventional means of handling large
sums. Such a peculiarity is consistent with his testi-
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mony, and the testimony of his wife Mildred, that they
kept large sums of cash around the house, and that they,
in fact, had sufficient cash on hand to pay the delinquencies of $15,000.00 or more when the tenders were
made. (T-329,320)
.
. _
:
Mr. Maxfield testified (T-330, 331) that in addition
to other sums on hand in 1969, he had, prior to making
the July 5 tender, obtained a loan commitment from the
Clearfield State Bank for $15,000.00 to be used along
with the other funds to pay the contract off in full if
necessary. Mr. Bruce Watkins, manager of the Sunset
Branch of the Clearfield State Bank confirmed that a
loan commitment had been made for the sum of $15,000.00.
(T-229)
Mr. Lester Ralph Romero testified that he was the
owner of the Poor Boy Cafe (T-365) and the Airport
Motel (T-365, 366) in Salt Lake City, and that his assets
were available to back up the tenders, both in 1969, and
in 1970. The objective evidence also leads inexorably
to the conclusion that the defendants were able to produce the monies necessary to perform their tenders had
such tenders ever been accepted. Exhibit D-46, a thrift
certificate from Interlake Thrift dated October 23, 1969,
in the amount of $10,000.00, and Exhibit D-47, a thrift
certificate from Interlake Thrift bearing the date of
October 26, 1971, in the sum of $9,000.00 amply verify
the ability of Mr. Romero to meet the terms of the tender.
In contrast to the compelling evidence adduced by
the defendants of their ability to perform their tenders,
the plaintiffs produced only the unsubstantiated testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall that sometime between
July 5, 1969, and July 9, 1969, they went out to the
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ranch in Chester and talked to Eeed and Mildred Maxfield, told them they were delighted to accept their
tender, and had come for the money. Bagnalls testified
that Reed Maxfield offered them cemetery lots and some
wholesale grocer stamps, etc., and refused to pay the
money. (T-150). Such testimony by them is unsupported
by anything other than their naked word, and is in total
contradiction to the written rejections by Tibbs and Kofford, and contrary to their stipulation that none of the
tenders were ever accepted. This stipulation was made
by them and by their counsel in their presence at one of
the pre-trial conferences and was embodied in the pretrial order on page 9, paragraph 15 as follows:
" Plaintiffs have not, at any time, accepted any
of the various written tenders made on behalf of
the defendants beginning with the July 5, 1969
letter of Mr. Maxfield to the present time."
Faced with such contradictory positions by the
plaintiffs, and in the light of the compelling evidence
adduced by the defendants, the jury could only come to
the conclusion they did, i.e., that the plaintiff had not
proved the defendants unable to perform their tenders.
The plaintiffs having failed to establish the defendants
inability to perform, the finding must be that the tenders
were good. The trial judge, however, had even more compelling evidence which mandated judgment in favor of
the defendants rather than the plaintiffs. On September 27, 1972, the defendants made a proffer of proof
to Judge Erickson at a hearing upon a motion for summary judgment. The proffer consisted of certain certificates of deposit in the name of Ralph Romero totaling $80,000.00. The certificates antedated the tenders
made by Mr. Romero of August 28, 1970. This proffer
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is embodied in Judge Erickson's unsigned order of October 11,1972. (R-....)
In other words, the record, as available to the trial
judge required that he find the tenders good, and enter
judgment for the defendants. To grant the plaintiffs'
motion for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
clearly wrong, contrary to all credible evidence, against
the weight of the evidence, and an abuse of discretion,
if indeed he had any discretion at all on this point.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS WAIVED TENDER BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS AN ACCOUNTING, BY REJECTING THEIR WRITTEN TENDERS, AND BY DEMANDING
THE ENTIRE CONTRACT BALANCE
On July 5, 1969, Reed R. Maxfield, on behalf of
Suburbia Land Company, made a written tender of "any
and all amounts that are due to J. R. Bagnall under
the terms of that certain real estate contract dated September 1, 1962." (Exhibit P-15). In response thereto,
plaintiff's attorney, Don V. Tibbs, notified the defendants that their partial payments would not be accepted
and demanded full satisfaction of the indebtedness. (Exhibit P-16) Mr. Bagnall testified at the trial that "We
were asking at that time for the entire contract." (Line
25, T-37). Plaintiff then enumerates some of the problems he was allegedly having over the property after
which the following colloquy took place:
"Q In other words, at this point you were totally fed up, is that correct?
" A We were totally fed up. Thank you for furnishing that word for me.
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"Q All right. And it was your desire to repossess the property at that time?
*
;

"A

Thatistrue."

Then on pages 41 and 42 of the transcript, quoting
from the questions and answers given at plaintiff's deposition, the following question was asked about the
amount demanded by Tibbs' July letter and received the
following answer:
"Q You don't know how much is being demanded here ?
" A The amount being demanded there would be
the total amount of the contract, plus that which
was in arrears plus the interest on the total contract plus the interest on the amount that was in
arrears plus the default in taxes and so forth,
that we had paid out. That comes roughly to
what it would be.''
Plaintiff then attempts to explain that he misinterpreted the letter when asked about it at the deposition.
The fact remains, however, that even plaintiff assumed
the letter was a demand for the entire balance due until
he realized, in preparation for the trial, that such a demand was improper at that time, and then attempted
to change his testimony. There is no question about
Maxfield's interpretation that it was a demand for the
entire contract balance. All parties testified that within
a day or two after the July 5 letter, plaintiffs met with
the Maxfields at the ranch in Chester. Plaintiffs claim
that they came to accept the tender, defendants claim
that they demanded the property back and refused to
accept payment of the delinquent installments. It is quite
evident the testimony given by J. B. Bagnall at his deposition more accurately depicts what happened, i.e. that
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they wanted the entire contract balance. Exhibit P-18,
a letter from Suburbia by Reed Maxfield dated July 15,
1969, again tenders the delinquencies and protests the
attempt to accelerate.
" I do not believe under the circumstance and in
view of the conversations, negotiations and agreements that Bagnall is entitled to declare the unpaid balance due and payable particularly without notice or reasonable opportunity to remedy
any default that may exist. Please reconsider my
tenders and advise. ry
Mrs. Bagnall testified on cross examination (R-166,
lines 1 through 19) that after departing from the meeting with the Maxfields at the ranch and upon the advice of counsel, they determined not to accept anything
less than the entire accelerated contract balance. It is
also evident from the testimony of Mr. Bagnall on crossexamination (T-108 & 109) that the Maxfields were told
by Mrs. Bagnall that plaintiffs did not want the money,
they wanted the land back. That statement was made,
according to J. R. Bagnall, at the ranch in Chester right
after July 5, 1969, tender, or at the home of Mrs. Bagnail's brother in Midvale at about the time the 1970
notice of default was served, and is consistent with the
testimony of Reed Maxfield that they refused to accept
the money and demanded the land back. (T-299)
All of the foregoing, together with the fact that
plaintiffs refused, without any justification, to give defendants an accounting or to tell them the amount of the
delinquency, excuses the defendants from making any
tender at all. Defendants could not make a tender of
money because they had no way of knowing the amount
due. Their written offer to pay the delinquencies if
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plaintiffs would just tell them how much was rejected
both verbally and in writing, and finally, plaintiffs rejected their obligations under the contract by refusing
to accept payment of the delinquencies by demanding
the entire contract balance, and by telling defendants
that they did not want the money, but wanted the land
back. Under such circumstances, any tender by the defendants, even if it had been a tender of the actual money
would have been a vain and useless act. The law does
not require the doing of a vain and useless thing. Veigh
Cummings et. al. vs. J. Elmo England, et al., (1961) 12
U.2d. 69, 362 P.2d 584. See also 52 AM. Jur. Tender,
pages 216, 217, Sec. 4; Thomas vs. Johnson (1919) 55
Utah 424, 186 P. 437; Evans vs. Houtz (1920), 57 Utah
216,193 P. 858.
In the case of Evans vs. Houtz (1920), 57 Utah 216,
the court said: "Where defendants repudiated a contract for the sale of lands, and announced that they
would not accept, such conduct was a waiver of formal
tender.'' See also Thomas vs. Johnson, 186 P. 437;
Pool vs. Motter, 185 P. 714; Cummings vs. Nielson, 42
Utah 169, 129 P. 619; Obrecht vs. Lamd & Water Co., 44
Utah 270, 140 P. 117. In the Evans case, Houtz entered
into a contract to sell certain land and water stock to
Evans. When it came time for Evans to make the final
payment, the land had increased in value and Houtz
refused to allow the escrow to deliver the deed, stating
that she would not accept the money and declaring that
the land and the water stock belonged to her.
In Cummings vs. England (1961), 12 U.2d 69, 362
P. 2d 584, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement to
purchase an undivided one-half interest in a ranch in
Summit County which the defendants were purchasing
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on contract. The agreement with plaintiffs provided for
certain penalties upon default of payment, including the
forfeiture of plaintiffs interest under the contract. Payments of $1,500 were to be made semi-annually by the
plaintiffs on the 1st of April and October, and provided
for a 30 day grace period. Plaintiffs did not make the
October payment when due, and on October 28 (still
within the 30 day grace period) defendants informed
plaintiffs that they were dissatisfied with the arrangement and would exercise their option under the contract
to buy plaintiffs out, "unless conditions changed and
the parties could come to some satisfactory solution."
The grace period passed and the defendants then notified plaintiffs that they were terminating the contract
for failure to make the October payment on time. Cummings then tendered the $1,500 and took the position
that the contract was still in force.
The supreme court agreed with the trial court taking the position that
" Under such circumstances it was reasonable for
appellants to conclude that no further payments
from them under the contract would be expected
or accepted by respondents, and appellants were
therefore excused from making a tender of the
payment within the 30-day grace period. It follows respondents therefore did not have the right
to terminate the contract for failure to make this
payment, since the law does not require the doing
of a vain and useless thing/9 Italics added.
In other words, although appellants did in fact
make a tender after the 30 day grace period, no tender
was required at all, since the respondents had already
made it clear they would not accept it in any event. See
also the case of Thomas vs. Johnson (1919), 55 Utah 424,
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186 P. 437, where the vendor refused to tender the required abstract and repudiated the contract. The court
stated that a tender of the purchase price " would have
been an idle ceremony. The law never compels a person
to do that which is vain or useless."
In the case of Aus vs. Rosenbaum the vendor refused to give the vendee an accounting of the balance
due. The vendees never made a formal tender and apparently brought an action against the sellers to compel
an accounting. The vendors claimed forfeiture by failure to make a formal tender. The court found on page
558 of Vol. 21, Southern Reporter, that since the accounts had never been furnished to the purchasers " I t
was impossible for them to know what amount was due,
and equally impossible for them to tender an unknown
sum. Finding that tender had been waived by the sellers,
the court asks: '' Shall any man be required by any rule
to perform an impossible act ?'' And so on ad infinitum.

POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEFAULT
IS DEFECTIVE AND CANNOT FORFEIT
OR TERMINATE THE INTEREST OF THE
DEFENDANTS UNDER THE CONTRACT.
STRICT PERFORMANCE HAD BEEN WAIVED.
The trial court ruled, and the evidence amply supports
that ruling, that all parties to the contract and modifica agreement waived the time of the essence provisions
of the modification agreement and waived strict compliance with the terms of the agreement. Having once
waived strict compliance, the plaintiffs are required to
give the defendants reasonable notice to cure the de-
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faults and to give them notice of their intention to hold
them to strict compliance in the future. The Utah court
has spoken conclusively on this question in the case of
Pacific Development Company vs. Stewart, 113 IT. 403,
195 P. 2d 745, wherein the court held that once having
waived strict performance, the vendor had the duty of
giving the purchasers a reasonable notice before they
could insist on strict performance by the purchasers.
The Bagnalls therefore cannot default the defendants
until they have given them notice of their intention to
hold them to strict performance in the future, and have
afforded them a reasonable time in which to cure the.
defaults.
PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF DEFAULT FATALLY AMBIGUOUS. It is the defendant's position that
the May 25, 1970 notice which the plaintiffs rely upon
to establish their right to default the defendants was
fatally ambiguous. As is evident from the pleading and
testimony at the trial, the amount of any default was
hotly contested and was, according to the defendant, no
more than $13,977.28 (R-370) or even nothing at all.
Even after trial, the court was unable to establish what
the amount of default was, finding only that it was "in
excess of $15,000 as of July 9, 1969." (R-713) Under
such circumstances, plaintiffs certainly had an obligation to tell the defendants what amounts would satisfy
their demand to cure the defaults.
Had the plaintiffs demanded something in the vicinity of $14,000 to $16,000, defendants would at least
have had some idea what would be necessary in order
to cure the "default" even if they were to pay it under
protest. The contract and modification agreement contained no acceleration clause allowing for a demand for
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the full purchase price upon default by the purchaser,
yet the notice relied upon by the plaintiffs, indeed all
of the demands by the plaintiffs, demanded the full balance of $48,535.70, together with taxes and an unspecified sum of interest. The general rule is that a written
notice should be clear, definite, and explicit, and not ambiguous. A notice that is ambiguous, misleading and unintelligible to the average person who is to be affected
by it is insufficient. 55 Am. Jur., "Vendor and Purchaser''
p. 505; Holly Dev. Inc. vs. Board of County Commissioners, 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032; Shuey vs. Hamilton,
(Montana, 1963) 381 P. 2nd 482. It is evident that the
notice served by the Bagnalls did not apprize the defendants of what would be demanded of them in order
to avoid default, and in fact, demanded over two and
one-half times the amount actually due.
AMOUNT OF DEFAULTS UNKNOWN TO DEFENDANTS. It is equally obvious that defendants
could not have obtained the amount of default from
their own records, nor from the records of the escrow.
Mr. Edgar Anderson, escrow officer for the bank, testified (T-45) that he could not tell the buyer what the
taxes, insurance, and water assessments were. Apparently the buyer would have to check with Bagnalls, or
make separate inquiries of the two water companies for
the water assessments, inquiries of the county assessor
for the taxes, and inquiries to Bagnall for the insurance
premiums. In regard to any inquiries to Bagnall, it
must be remembered that, by their tenders, and by other
correspondence defendants had, in fact, inquired of
Bagnalls and were met with an outright rejection and
refusal to disclose the amount due. Taking even the most
charitable view of the evidence, no one but the Bagnalls
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could have told the defendants the amount of unpaid
insurance, since only they themselves would know that.
The Utah court, in the case of Romero vs. Schmidt
(1969) 15 U2d 300, 392 P. 2d. 37 held that such an unreasonable refusal on the part of the vendor, excused the
purchaser from even making a tender, and voided the
vendor's notice of default.
Compounding these difficulties, however, is the fact
that there is absolutely no way the defendants could
determine the amount of unpaid installments, taxes, and
etc., which would be necessary to forestall the notice of
default by the plaintiffs. Even the plaintiffs themselves
were unsure of the amount of default. In their amended
complaint they pleaded default from and after March
20, 1968 (or apparently so), claimed the amount of delinquencies to be $48,535.70, taxes of $820.20 together
with $151.00 interest thereon, and an unspecified sum
for taxes and for interest on the principal. Yet at the
trial they introduced evidence of alleged delinquencies
going all the way back to December of 1962, amounting
to something "in excess of $15,000.00" (Exhibit P-37 and
B-713).
On the other hand, the defendants had every reason
to believe that the obligation to make up many of the
alleged delinquencies had been forgiven. The long lapse
of time (from December, 1962 to July, 1969) alone would
be sufficient reason to believe that many of the defaults
had been forgiven. The plaintiffs' own objective evidence supports the defendants' contention that arrangements were made from time to time to reinstate the
contract after admitted defaults. See for example Exhibit P-48, wherein the plaintiffs, by and through their
attorney, Don V. Tibbs, state that they were " willing
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to go along with the matter," provided the back taxes
were paid and "the payments are made monthly
promptly, as required by the contract." It is obvious
from the content of the letter, written October 29, 1965,
that plaintiffs were complaining about unpaid installments and unpaid taxes. Even a cursory glance at Exhibit P-ll and P-13 shows that the taxes were paid thereafter as requested and that regularly monthly payments
were made in the succeeding months. In other words,
the plaintiffs had waived their right to insist upon paymen of installments prior to October 29, 1965. Even if
they had not, they had put defendants into a position
that they could not know, in July, 1969, and October,
1970, whether they would be required to pay those installments or not. With such uncertainty of the amount
due, the defendants ought not to be required to pay an
uncertain and unspecified amount at the risk of having
that forfeited too if it should turn out that they had
underpaid because of the uncertainty, or if it should
later turn out that the plaintiffs demand for the accelerated balance was, in fact, correct. Under such uncertainty, the plaintiff's notice of default must properly set
forth the amount they are demanding in order to avoid
default.
The Montana court in the case of Radar vs. Taylor,
333 P. 2d 480 voided a notice of default which demanded
the accelerated balance due when the contract did not
provide for acceleration, and, among other reasons given
for its decision stated at page 487:
"Furthermore, defendants ought not to be required to pay the $13,000 which is admittedly due
and which was correctly demanded in the notice
at the risk of having it forfeited too, in the event
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that it should finally be held as contended by
plaintiffs that the contract contained an acceleration clause."
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEFAULT INVALID
BECAUSE IT DEMANDED MORE THAN WAS
DUE. The plaintiffs notice of default is fatally defective and invalid for the reason that it makes an improper demand for payment of the accelerated balance
amounting to a sum over two and a half times the amount
actually found to be due by the court. It is true that
the demand for taxes and interest may be correctly set
forth therein, and it was this fact that the trial court
relied upon when it found the notice to be effective (Pretrial order Page 3, paragraph 1 R ....). Those amounts
pale into insignificance, however, in comparison with
the demand for the whole of the principal balance due.
The Iowa court in the case of Gibson vs. Thode, 328 N.W.
91, enunciated the reason and the purpose for the notice :
"The real purpose of a notice of this kind is to
bring home to the vendee the very reason for the
notice of foreifture, in other words, to advise the
vendee what he must do to avoid the forfeiture;
* * *." (Emphasis added)
The defendants in the instant case certainly were
not advised of what they must do. If they paid at all,
they paid at their peril. If they miscalculated and paid
too little, they ran the risk of having that amount also
forfeited. If they paid too much, or paid as demanded,
they would be making an admission of liability therefore, even if they did not owe it, and they could not
recover it back even if they should later prevail in a
lawsuit.
The courts are divided on the effect of such an excessive demand. The Utah court, however, has found
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such a notice to be defective and insufficient to effect a
default under the contract. The case of Wayne E. Carroll vs. Phil M. Birdsoll (1970) 24 U 2d 411, 473 P 2d
398, is self explanatory.
"The defendants, though questioning it, appear
to have been in default and behind in their payments, at least during most of over 13 years,
when, on March 12, 1968, the seller served a written notice on defendants to 1) pay up the delinquencies which the notice said amounted to $2,175.00 (which defendants emphatically denied to
be the case), for $150 per month future monthly
payments, for an unspecified sum for costs and
expenses, and $475.00 attorneys fees, all "in accordance with the terms'' of the contract else suit
would follow to recover under the statutes. It is
obvious that the notice given required the buyers
to do something other than "In accordance with
the contract," namely, that as a condition of keeping possession, the buyers would have to pay
$150, instead of $100, per month in the future,
would have to pay an unspecified amount of costs
and expenses and $475 attorney's fees set by the
sellers themselves. It is equally obvious that such
a notice could not possibly convert buyers into
tenants at will, since it required the buyers to do
more than that for which the contract called, including unascertained costs and pre-determined
attorney's fees before suit." (Italics added)
The Bagnall notice likewise required the buyers to
do something other than in accordance with the terms of
the contract, namely to pay the accelerated balance. And,
similarly to Carroll vs. Birdsoll, Bagnall demanded unspecified interest. It is equally obvious that Bagnalls'
notice could not possibly put the defendants into default,
or as staed by the Carroll vs. Birds all court, "convert
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buyers into tenants at will." The judgment against the
defendants should, therefore be reversed, and the plaintiffs'complaint dismissed.
POINT V
BY ACCEPTING PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT AFTER NOTICE OF FORFEITURE
AND COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT, PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THEIR NOTICE AND REINSTATED THE CONTRACT.
The modification agreement specifically provided
that the payments were to be made to the Bank of Ephraim. In conformity therewith, the great majority of the
payments made by defendants after the signing of the
modification agreement were made to the Bank of
Ephraim. The agreement provided that plaintiffs were
to set up the escrow. This they did, by means of an
"Escrow Receipt." (Exhibit P-14). The only instruction
contained in that "receipt" is a provision that money
is to be withheld from the last payment sufficient to pay
for revenue stamps upon recording. The "receipt"
acknowledges receipt of the real estate agreement, the
modification agreement and the warranty deed (Exhibit
P 7), and agrees to deliver the documents in escrow according to the terms of the agreements. Certain understanding of the payment terms is then set forth. The
"Escrow Receipt" is signed on behalf of the Bank of
Ephraim, and by J. R. Bagnall. Nowhere does the signature of the purchasers appear (Exhibit P-14).
Over the years, the bank received certain documents
which were to be delivered to the defendants upon compltion of the escrow. It received certain correspondence
from the Bagnalls, and it received payments from the
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defendants and forwarded them on to the Bagnalls. At
no time did it ever receive any correspondence from
the Buyers (Testimony of E d g a r Anderson, T-15) or
anything for delivery to the purchasers — at least nothing to be delivered prior to payment of all of the installments, and etc.
On December 1, 1971, long after plaintiffs had commenced their suit to recover possession of the real property, defendants delivered to the escrow, the Bank of
Ephraim, a monthly payment for $400.00, which sum the
bank accepted, receipted, posted to interest, and forwarded to the plaintiffs. (Exhibit D-18). Plaintiffs
refused the monies and returned them to the bank
where they were deposited to a checking account opened
by Bagnall. (Exhibit P-27). It is the defendants' position that the acceptance of this payment, after notice
of default, is wholly inconsistent with a forfeiture, effectively waived the forfeiture, and reinstated the contract, even if it were conceded that there had been a
valid forfeiture.
So also with the notice to quit served upon Reed
and Mildred Maxfield by mail, August 19, 1971. (See
Amended Complaint R-95 and Exhibit P-46). The election by the plaintiffs to treat the contract as void, evidenced by the notice to quit, was wholly inconsistent with
the notice of forfeiture previously served. If the forfeiture notice was sufficient to terminate the defenda n t s ' interest in the contract it was effectively waived
by the inconsistent notice to quit alleging the modification agreement void, and constituting a repudiation of
the agreement.
The rule is obvious that a vendor cannot claim a forfeiture and at the same time receive the purchase money,
and does not warrant a multiplication of authorities.
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"Accordingly, there can be no doubt that a vendor
by receiving money when past due is precluded
from availing himself of any right of forfeiture
which has arisen because of the failure to pay
the same on time.'' 55 Am Jur P. 1018.
See Krell vs. Cohen (1921), 214 Mich. 590, 183 N.W.
53; Maday vs. Roth, 160 Mich. 291, 125 N.W. 13; Barber
vs. Stone, 104 Mich. 90, 62 N.W. 139; Patterson vs. Carrel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158; RubensUne vs. Powers
(1921), 215 Mich. 438, 184 N.W. 589; Walter vs. Lieverman, 214 Mich. 428,183 N.W. 235.
In the case of Christy vs. Guild (Utah 1942), 121
P.2d 401, the Utah court found that there had been no
waiver of the notice of forfeiture by acceptance of payments because of the special provision against such
waiver contained in the contract. The court did agree
with the principle of waiver however.
Although it has been stated that the escrow "agent"
is the agent of both parties (and the trial court so ruled),
it is clear that the "agent", if an agent at all, is a very
special kind of agent. 28 AM. Jur. 2d, Escrow, Sec. 11
states:
" I n a broad sense, every depository of an escrow
is the agent of both parties . . . and he may, therefore, be looked upon as a special agent of both
parties, with powers limited only to those stipulated in the escrow agreement . . . the escrow
holder is merely a conduit used in the transaction
for convenience and safety."
The Restatement of the Law of Agency 2d., Section
14 D, says that an "escrow holder is not, as such, an agent
of either party to the transaction until the event occurs
which terminates the escrow relation." In other words,
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the escrow is actually a fiduciary, having a fiduciary relationship to each party to the escrow until he comes into
possession of something which he is obligated to deliver
to one party or the other. At that time he becomes the
agent of the party to whom he is obligated to make the
delivery. It is obvious that the bank was the agent of the
Bagnalls for the collection and disbursement of the installment payments. The bank never became the agent
of the defendants as is demonstrated by determining on
whom the loss would fall if the bank were to default in
its obligations or to embezzle the documents or payments.
If, after delivering a payment to the bank, the money
should be embezzled, it is clear that the loss would fall
on the plaintiffs. Having delivered it to the bank, the
buyers had done all that was required of them under the
contract, hence the bank must be the agent for the Bagnalls, and the loss would fall on them.
On the other hand, suppose the bank were to embezzle
the warranty deed. Whose loss would it be? Could the
plaintiffs avoid executing and delivering another on the
ground that the escrow was the agent of the buyersCertainly not! The water stock? Suppose that were lost
by the bank prior to payment of the contract in full.
Obviously Bagnalls again must bear the loss. In what
way,, then, is the escrow an agent of the buyers herein.
Prior to payment of the contract in full, have the Bagnalls
delivered anything to the escrow the title of which passed
to the buyers ? No! What kind of an agent of the buyers
is this that holds nothing belonging to them, that, up to
the present time at least, owes them no duty, and has
performed no service for them? The trial court was
clearly in error when it determined as a finding of fact
50
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that the escrow was the agent of both parties. As a matter
of law, it could only be the agent of the Bagnails.
By service of the May 25, 1970 Notice of Forfeiture,
the plaintiffs attempted to terminate the real estate
agreement and the modification agreement, thereby
effectively terminating the authority of the escrow. They
neglected to notify the escrow, however, or to in any way
apprize the Bank of the purported termination of the
agreements, and the termination of the escrow authority.
Quite the contrary, long after such purported termination and after their refusal to acknowledge the receipt of
the $400.00 payment to the bank, the Bagnalls utilized
the escrow to their own advantage by attempting to correct some of their own defaults, i.e., on or about March
15, 1971, they deposited with the escrow six shares of
Moroni Irrgaton stock, and on or about Aprl 3, 1973,
they deposted ten shares of Chester Irrigation stock.
(Testimony of Edgar Anderson, T-24, Exhibit P-13, 14).
Such actions by them are totally inconsistent with
their position that the contract was at an end and the
authority of the escrow terminated. How can they make
their payments to the escrow (or, in other words, how
can they deposit their stock into the escrow), expect to
bind the defendants thereby, and yet deny the buyers
the same privilege of paying into the escrow and binding
the sellers 1 The answer is that they cannot! The case of
State vs. Walien (Minn. 1932) is illustrative of the principle. The court said the principle's "intent not to ratify
agent's unauthorized acts does not prevent ratification
by acceptance of benefits with knowledge." The point to
be made here is that even though he does not want to
ratify (or acknowledge the authority of the escrow) he
will be found to have done so where his actions are in51
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

consistent with an intent not to ratify. The court further
stated that the " principal cannot avail himself of the
unauthorized acts of his agent, so far as it is advantageous to him, and repudiate the obligations. In other words
he must acknowledge the authority of the bank (as he has
done by depositing the water stock) or he must deny
(as he attempted to do by refusing to accept the defendants payments). He cannot have it both ways.
The Utah court has spoken loudly and clearly on the
effect of acceptance of payment by the escrow after notice
of default to the purchaser. In the case of The United
States of America vs. Colombine Coal Company, No.
12459, filed February 3, 1972, the United States of
America brought suit against the Colombine Coal Company for foreclosure on two notes and the securities
given therefor. The Economic Development Administration was the holder for one note in the sum of $325,000,
and the S.B.A. was the holder of the second note for
|100,000. The S.B.A., was also the servicing agent for
both notes.
The coal company defaulted in the payments on the
notes, and on December 1, 1969, the plaintiff gave notice
that pursuant to the provisions in the notes, it was
accelerating all payments and would thereafter not accept
past due payments on either of the notes. Apparently the
plaintiff did not notify the S.B.A. On January 15, 1970,
the coal company paid to the S.B.A. the sum of $79,226.83
which was received by the S.B.A., credited to unpaid
interest and installments on the E.D.A. note and the
surplus applied to the S.B.A. loan.
The E.D.A. attempted to disclaim the application of
the proceeds as credited by S.B.A. Justice Ellett, writing
for the court, held that the E.D.A. was bound by the ac52
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ceptance and application of the payment by its servicing
agent the S.B.A. "By accepting payment on delinquent
interest and principal after notice of acceleration, the
plaintiff waived its notice and reinstated the loan."
" I t may be that the Colombine Coal Company is
now in such arrears that it will not be able to pay
the two notes, or it might be that if permitted it
could pay both notes in full. Until a new notice
.,.., is served upon it, there is no way of knowing that.
All that we now hold is that by accepting payment
on delinquent interest and installments after
notice of acceleration had been given, the plain•j
; tiff waived the notice it had given."
Clearly, then, the Bank of Ephraim acted as agent for
the plaintiffs only. It never became the agent of the defendant, having only a fiduciary's obligation to deliver
the deed when the contract was paid in full. The defendants herein, as did the defendant Colombine Coal Company, knew that the plaintiffs had declared a forfeiture
at the time payment was made to the escrow. Even so, the
plaintiff was, and should be, bound by the acceptance of
the payment by the escrow, thereby waiving the notice of
forfeiture. See also Damiano vs. Finney (Idaho 1970)
464P.2d522
POINT

VI

EVEN ASSUMING PLAINTIFFS HAD VALIDLY FORFEITED THE CONTRACT, DE- ,
FENDANTS' OFFER TO PAY THE ENTIRE
CONTRACT BALANCE AND THEIR OFFER
TO PAY THE SAME INTO THE REGISTRY
OF THE COURT SHOULD REINSTATE
THE CONTRACT.
On September 28, 1972, defendant Lester R. Romero appeared before Judge Fredinand Erickson to53
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gether with his counsel, Eobert L. Lord, for hearing on
various motions, including defendants motion to dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds that valid tender had
been made. At that time, Mr. Romero had with him savings certificates of approximately $80,000.00 which were
proffered to the Court in support of the motion. Judge
Erickson refused to allow defendant to be heard on the
motion, and refused to accept the proffer of proof. (See
Letter of Mr. Lord dated October 11, 1972, and accompanying unsigned Order prepared for Judge Erickson's
signature).
Defendants did thereafter make written tender of
the entire contract balance, together with interest, taxes,
and other sums due under the contract (Pre-Trial Order
pp. 1 & 2, B~—.). Although it does not appear anywhere
in the record, it should also be noted that at the pretrial
conference of September 29, 1973, or possibly one of the
preceding sessions, defendants' attorney, Robert L. Lord,
offered on behalf of the defendants, to pay $70,000 into
the registry of the court to be used if and when the defendants tender of the entire contract balance should be
accepted and if the court had granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment. Judge Harding stated in effect
that that would not be necessary. Thereafter an escrow
agreement was entered into between GL T. Lisonbee and
Sanpete Land & Livestock Company wherein $65,000
worth of savings crtificates were deposited with Valley
Bank and Trust. (See affidavit of Kerry G-. Judd dated
February 13, 1975, on file with the Supreme Court). The
escrow of the certificates was again for the purpose of
backing up the tender of payment in full.
While there appears to be little if any functional
difference between an installment land contract and a
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purchase money mortgage (both secure payment of unpaid purchase money, and, until the debt is fully paid,
the buyer's rights are encumbered by a lien in favor of
the unpaid seller), nevertheless, seemingly mostly for
historical rasons, the law of land contracts and the law
of mortgages have developed along separate lines. As a
result, the rights of the land contract purchaser are governed largely by contract principles, while the rights of
the defaulting mortgagor are governed by equitable
principles.
"Thus, while at one time the defaulting mortgagor appealed to equity's discretion to allow him to
redeem, after a time, the mortgagor's 'right' of
redemption became so well established that the
defaulting mortgagors did not have to show any
special equity to invoke equity's power, and instead it became necessary for the mortgagee to
foreclose the mortgagor's equity of redemption
because, unless terminated by a court of equity
(or under a statutory procedure for foreclosure),
the mortgagor's equity generally continues indefinitely unbated. In contrast, specific performances and relief from a forfeiture in the case of
a defaulting land contract purchaser are discretionary, such purchaser generally having no absolute right of redemption which the vendor must
foreclose. However, there is some indication of
movement in the courts in the direction of treating an installment land contract as substantially
the equivalent of a mortgage or deed of trust."
(55 ALE 3d 17, emphasis added)
See H & L Land Co. vs. Warner (1972, Fla. App.)
258 So. 2d 293, wherein the court took the position that
the purchaser and vendor under an installment land
contract were in essentially the same position as a mortgagor and mortgagee. Further on on page 16 of 55 ALR
3d the annotator states:
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"

' i Thus, it would appear that notwithstanding general recognition of the validity of the time-ofessence and forfeiture provisions of installment
land contracts, the rights of purchasers to specific
performance is denied, and forfeiture of past payments, and improvements permitted, only in those
instances in which the purchaser cannot, under
the particular facts of the case, make out a case
for equitable relief. In the relatively rare instances in which specific performance has been
denied under circumstances in which the purchaser
tenders the full amount due, the grounds have
often been that the nature of the defaults of the
purchaser indicated an abandonment of the contract." (emphasis added)

The courts of many states have seized on almost
any excuse to avoid a forfeiture.
F o r example, the Court of Appeals of Washington
held in the case of Will Rogers Farm Agency, Inc. vs.
Stafford (1971) 482 P.2d. 336, that a purchaser in default
could avoid forfeiture of title under certain circumstances
by paying into the registry of court an amount sufficient
to bring the contract payments up to date and reimburse
plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The
Washington court had previously held that "Forfeiture
are not favored in law and are never enforced in equity
unless the right thereto is so clear as to permit no den i a l . " Dill v. Zielbe, 173 P . 2d 977 at 1946. See also
Knowles v. Anderson 22 P. 2d 657.
The Utah court has never squarely faced the issue of
whether a buyer in default will be relieved of a forfeiture
solely because he tenders payment in full or deposits the
required amount with the court. The basic rule was laid
down in the case of Kohler vs. Lundberg (Utah 1919)
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180 P. 2d, 590. The purchaser of land under an installment
land contract had defaulted and the seller brought an
action for forfeiture. There was a dispute as to whether
the seller had granted an extension of time to make the
payment. The court held that the forfeiture would not be
allowed and stated:
"Courts of equity are loath to enforce a forfeiture, especially when refusal to do so, as in this
case, gives to all parties to the agreement every
right to which they are entitled, and this in no
way works a hardship upon anyone."
Two years later Tremonton vs. Home (Utah 1921),
202 P. 2d 547, was decided. The purchaser had failed to
make payments due to fear that the vendor could not
deliver marketable title. The court refused to allow a
forfeiture, finding that the defendant had been ready and
willing to pay all amounts due under the terms of the contract and that the same had been declined or refused by
the plaintiff.
In 1955 the Utah court refused to allow a forfeiture
because "refusal to do so * * # works no hardship upon
anyone." Swain vs. Salt Lake Real Estate, 279 P. 2d 709.
And finally, in the case of Strand vs. Mayne (1963),
14 U. 2d 355, 384, P. 2d, 396, the Utah court allowed forfeiture when a buyer defaulted on his payments, vacated,
and later brought suit to recover his down payment and
installments already paid. But Justice Henriod pointed
out in his concurring opinion that:
"Had Strand sought specific performances, tendering into court the amount of their delinquent
payments, the cases cited in the main opinion
might be aprops. This is not a case where a seller
is seeking to forfeit out a necessitous buyer under
a uniform real estate contract, but one where a
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buyer, showing nothing in the way of excuse for
not carrying out his part of the contract, seeks to
recover something from a seller willing to perform. * * * (emphasis added)
For additional references to cases in support of the
defendants position herein, see Jameson vs. Wurtz
(Alaska) 396 P2d 68, 74; McCormick vs. Grove (Alaska)
495 P. 2d 1268; Moran vs. Holman (Alaska) 50- P. 2d
769; Stockman's Supply vs. Jeane (Idaho 1951), 237
P. 613; Slobe vs. Kirby Stone, Inc. (Nevada 1968), 447
P. 2d 491; Barkis vs. Scott (Cal. 1949), 208 P. 2d 367.
As is readily seen from the above discussion, the
trend of many modern and progressive courts is to treat
the installment land contract and the mortgage the same
way, allowing the defaulting purchaser to reinstate the
contract or to remedy his default by tendering the delinquency, by tendering the entire balance due, or by
paying the money therefore into the registry of the court.
Defendants herein, beginning with the first written tender in July, 1969, have repeatedly tendered payment of
the delinquencies. In each instance the plaintiffs refused
the tender. As recently as September 28,1972, defendants
attempted to demonstrate ability to pay with the proffer
to Judge Erickson, and finally, on July 26, 1973, defendants tendered the entire balance due, and offered to pay
$70,000 into court to back up the tender. It is evident that
plaintiffs all along believed, and continue to believe that
the defendants can, in fact produce the monies to pay
their tenders, else why have they continually failed to
accept?
Here is a perefect opportunity for the court to do
equity. If the defendants be in default (and it is vehemently denied) they should be relieved of that for-
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feiture* " * * # To do so # * * works no hardship upon
anyone.'' and all parties will then receive the benefit of
their bargain.
POINT VII
THE COURT EBBED BY ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFFS TO PLEAD ALTEB EGO AND,
AT THE SAME TIME, MAINTAINING INCONSISTENT PBOVISIONS IN THE PBETBIAL OBDEB.
The pretrial order (B-....) provided that the 1970
notice of forfeiture upon which the plaintiffs' complaint
is based, was directed to the Idaho corporation and
would not be sufficient to terminate the purchasers interest under the contract if the plaintiffs had notice of
a valid transfer to any of the successor corporations or
parties. That order stands unchanged to the present
time and is in direct contradiction to the finding of alter
ego by the trial court. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs ' case, defendant Maxfield moved for judgment and
to be dismissed from the action upon the failure of the
plaintiffs to prove alter ego. The motion was granted.
Defendants likewise moved for judgment and to have the
plaintiffs' complaint dismissed for the same reason,
and in reliance upon the pretrial order. For reasons
unknown to the writer, that motion was denied. Yet in
its findings of fact, the trial court found that Beed Maxfield was the central and dominating personality behind
all of the corporate entities. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 9)
In paragraph 2 of page 4 of the pretrial order the
trial court determined that the July 9, 1969 letter from
Don V. Tibbs, and the July 14, 1969, letter from Cree-L
Kofford constituted rejections of defendants July 5
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tender. In addition the pretrial order stipulated that
the tender was not accepted (paragraph 15, p. 9). Yet
the court found in paragraph 14 of its findings of fact
that the defendants refused to make payments. The
pre-trial order and the findings are mutually contradictory.
Paragraph 7, page 5 of the pretrial order states that
the transfers from the Idaho corporation were valid,
yet makes a finding that they were void, voidable and
illegal, (paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact).
It was the responsibility of the plaintiffs to move to
amend the pretrial order if they so desired. Not having
done so, the pretrial order should have governed the
course of the trial. After having pleaded alter ego, the
plaintiffs should have been required to amend the pretrial order to properly state the issues and the status of
the case. Defendants, in reliance upon the order, which
was then almost totally ignored at the trial were prejudiced and should be granted judgment in accordance
with the provisions of the pretrial order.
POINT VIII

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
The verdict of the jury is confusing, contradictory,
and contrary to the evidence. Even so, the jury found
for the defendants upon the critical issue of ability to
perform their tenders. Defendants moved for judgment
upon the verdict (even though they were obviously being
shortchanged on damages for loss of the % interest in
the 140.15 acres and etc.) or, in the alternative, a new
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trial. The plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which judgment was granted by the trial
court.
A whole brief could be written pointing out the obvious home town prejudice of the jury as evidenced by
its wholly illogical answers to the special interrogatories.
Four short examples will suffice.
1) In special interrogatory 3, the jury determined
that the fair market value, as of July 16, 1962, of the
undivided one-half interest in the 140.15 acre tract of
land containing 70% of the improvements was $5,600.00.
By the most liberal interpretation of the 1952 contract
in the plaintiffs favor, the cost of the raw ground itself, without any improvements would have been $93.00
per acre in 1952, or a value of $6,573, in 1952 and without any improvements. Defendants' evidence showed a
value in 1962 of approximately $27,000.00!
2) The jury was made aware of the summary judgement quieting title to the % interest in the 140.15 acres
in United Paint and Color. The jury was also aware
that the trial court had ruled that to constitute a defect
for which the defendants were entitled to damages. Yet,
in the face of that, they found in an answer to special
interrogatory number 4 that the plaintiffs had, in fact,
acquired and maintained marketable title. Such a finding, in the face of the evidence and the court's ruling
is sheer nonsense and is sufficient, in and of itself to
show undue prejudice on the part of the jury and against
the defendants.
The jury also found that the plaintiffs were not in
default because of their failure to deposit all water stock
with the escrow as required by the modification agree61
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ment. For crying out loud! If the plaintiffs do not have
to comply with their part of the bargain, why, in heavens
name, must the defendants comply with theirs ?
3) The jury found, in answer to interrogatory number 7, that the plaintiffs had no obligation to respond
to the tender made by Les Romero, even though it was
timely made and the court had determined it to be valid
tender (except for the question of ability to perform).
The law itself, requires a response to a tender, and it is
so legislated in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-27-3. In
other words, the jury finding is contrary to the expressed
will of the legislature.
4) The jury found (Interrogatories 13 and 14) that
the railroad right of way and the county road easements
did not constitute defects in Bagnalls' title. It is obvious
that they do constitute defects as a matter of law, and
again demonstrates the bias and prejudice of the jury.
Even so, the jury found that the plaintiffs had
failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the defendants were not able to perform their tenders.
In other words, even granting the jury's bias in favor
of them, the plaintiffs utterly failed to produce
any substantial proof on that vital point. It is quite
clear that, had they produced anything at all, the jury
would have found in their favor.
It may well be that the Court should disregard the
jury verdict in this matter. That is well within its province since the jury is advisory only. However, it cannot
pick and choose. If it disregards any portion of it, it
must consider anew, all issues raised by the pleadings
and the testimony. This the court failed to do. Had it
considered the very compelling evidence that the mod62
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ification agreement should be adjusted downward, by
some $54,000, and had it made a determination of the
amount of damages to be awarded for the loss of the
% interest, for the loss of the county roads, for the loss
of the railroad right of way, and for the loss of land
still in the name of J. A. Bagnall, and etc., it could very
well have determined that, not only was the contract
not in default, but that the defendants were entitled to
the warranty deed.
POINT IX
PLAINTIFFS' TESTIMONY ON ALL CRUCIAL MATTERS IS CONTRADICTORY AND
AT ODDS WITH THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED
A reading of the entire transcript of testimony reveals instances in which the plaintiffs themselves are
in disagreement over simple objective facts. It is apparent that plaintiffs attempted to present their testimony on certain crucial matters in the way they conceived most helpful to their cause. For example, Mr.
Bagnall testified that the 1962 balance on the contract
was determined from the rather sketchy records available to all family members and parties to the contract
(T-89, 116; Depo. 21, 22). Mrs. Bagnall, on the other
hand, testified that they maintained a very good set
of books which were kept by a C.P.A. (T-161, 162).
Mr. Bagnall positively and definitely stated that
he had never used his son's name. (T-14, Depo. - 75). It
turned out that he did, however, and his own documentary evidence contradicts him. The deed of August 13,
1966, (Exhibit D-22) states that he is sometimes known
as J.A. Bagnall (his son's name). Plaintiff stated at
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his deposition that he used that name to clear up the
title to the land so that they could convey a marketable
title, if and when the contract was paid (Depo. 75, T-14).
He actually tried to clear his son's interest in the land
by his own warranty deed!
Both Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall testified that they had
never heard of any corporation other than Suburbia of
Idaho. (T-32). On the other hand, Mr. Tibbs, their
own lawyer at the time, testified quite definitely that
they knew of the Nevada corporation at least, and approved the assignment from the Idaho Corporation to
the Nevada corporation. (T-83, 84). In addition to Mr.
Tibbs' testimony, is the simple and compelling fact that
both plaintiffs signed a deed to the Nevada corporation
in September, 1965. (Exhibit D-32). Mrs. Bagnall, a
qualified real estate agent with ten years experience testified that she did not understand that the deed was to
the Nevada corporation. Fantastic!
Plaintiffs claimed ownership to a parcel of 17.45
acres of land that had been paid for in full in 1962, and
to which the plaintiffs had issued, and delivered a warranty deed. They entered into an oil lease including the
17.45 acres and received the rental payments therefore.
(Exhibit D-34). They sought to forfeit defendants' interest therein as part of the law suit and made claim
therefore in their amended complaint. (R-96, 117). Mr.
Bagnall testified at his deposition that he had never
signed a deed to the property. When shown the deed
he then backtracked and said that although he had
signed it he had never delivered it. He vehemently asserted that he had never been paid one red cent for the
17.45 acres. (Depo. 81). At the trial, however, plainitff's counsel stipulated that they were making no claim
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for the 17.45 acres, and the defendants, in fact, introduced receipts showing payment, together with the deed
from the plaintiffs. (Exhibits D-33, D-39).
Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall maintained at the trial that
Maxfield made only one trip to California to see them,
and that was in 1965. Yet on his deposition he stated
that Maxfield had been to his home on two or three occasions, and that he had no knowledge one way or the
other whether he had visited them in 1963 as testified
to by Maxfield. (T-370, 371, Depo. 70)
A rather rediculous tale is told by the plaintiffs
that they went to the ranch in Chester right after the
July 5, 1969 letter of tender and announced that they
were there for their money at which time Maxfield offered them some stamps in some type of wholesale grocery business together with some cemetery lots. (T-165).
All of this in direct contradiction to their own stipulation, entered into by their counsel and them at pre-trial
conference specifically stating that none of the tenders,
including the July 5 tender had been accepted, and in
contradiction to all written demands for payment which
demanded the whole unpaid balance.
As was discussed earlier, Mr. Bagnall supports the
defendants testimony that Mrs. Bagnall stated that they
did not want the money, they wanted the land back. Mrs.
Bagnall denied making any such statement.
And so on.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the facts in this
case clearly demonstrate:
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1) That the plaintiffs themselves were, and are,
in substantial and serious default under the terms of
the Real Estate Agreement and the Modification Agreement. They did not put all of the water stock into the
escrow until 1973. They cannot deliver unencumbered
title to the five acres consumed by the railroad and the
county road. They cannot deliver title, of any kind, to
the .57 acres on which the main dwelling is located. They
cannot deliver more than a xfa interest in the 140.15
acres on which all of the rest of the improvements of
any significance are located. They cannot deliver title
to the approximately 5 acres owned by J.A. Bagnall,
plaintiffs' son. 1.5 acres is owned of record by Caroline
M. Hansen, Eva Josephsen Hansen, and Mark Sharp
Hansen, The railroad appears to be the fee simple owner
of a strip of land 1 chain by 40 chains along the eastern
boundary of the property. Outstanding oil and gas leases
still appear of record, and, as of the time the plaintiffs
notified defendants of their alleged default, plaintiffs
had entered into a new oil and gas lease which was filed
of record, and they had not cleared the lis pendens
which they themselves had filed regarding a prior action
of foreclosure against defendants' assignors.
Time was made of the essence for both sellers and
buyers by virtue of the Modification Agreement. Both
parties waived that provision as a result of their actions,
once having waived, neither party could put the other
into default until such party had fully performed all of
his own obligations. Clearly the plaintiffs could not default the defendants herein, and the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed, the complaint of the plaintiff dismissed, and the matter remanded back to the
district court for a determination of the balance due
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under the contract, the offsets and damages to be allowed the defendants, a determination of the amount
of default, if any, on the part of the defendants, and the
court instructed to allow a reasonable time for the defendants to pay such defaults, if, indeed they exist at all.
2) Defendants tender of July 5, 1969, coming before
the notice of default, and the tender of August 28, 1970,
coming within the time allowed by the plantiffs' notice,
constituted timely and valid tender and should, therefore,
have prevented the plaintiffs' notice of default from
becoming effective, even if they had a right to default
the defendants, which they did not. Passing upon the
weight of evidence in the record, as this Court must, the
conclusion that the defendants tender was valid is inescapable.
3) After tender by the defendants, the plaintiffs rejected those tenders and demanded the whole of the accelerated balance which demand was improper. Having
rejected the tender and making improper demand for
payment, their notice was fatally defective and void.
4) After notice of forfeiture, the escrow, acting as
agent for the plaintiffs, accepted a payment on the contract and receipted and disbursed the same. That money
is, even yet, in an ordinary checking account under the
sole control of plaintiff. Such action clearly waives any
effect the notice of default may have had.
5) The defendants have tendered payment in full
(if anyone can ever figure out what it should be), offered to pay into the registry of the court, were told by
the trial judge that that would not be necessary, and
thereafter established an escrow of their own, and de67
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posited the necessary funds therein. If nothing else, this
alone should be sufficient for the court to "re-instate"
the contract.
6) Precedural errors committed by the trial court
were serious and prejudicial to the defendants, and the
court's judgment should be reversed. As pointed out
in Point VII, many of the rulings made at pretrial were
contradicted by rulings made at the trial. The pre-trial
order should have governed rather than being simply ignored.
For each, and for all, of the above reasons, the judgment should be reversed, the complaint dismissed, and
the matter remanded to the district court for further
proceedings in accordance herewith.
Costs and attorney fees should be awarded to the
Appellants-Defendants.
Respectfully submitted,

,

Robert L. Lord
118 Metro Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants
Suburbia & Romero
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